Building India's Next 10 Lakh Entrepreneurs

A Proposed National Policy & Implementation Framework

One Door. One Identity. One Journey. From Aspiration to Enterprise.

India does not need another entrepreneurship scheme. It needs the connective infrastructure that turns existing schemes, institutions, capital, knowledge and markets into one continuous entrepreneurial journey.

A note on where this blueprint comes from.

This blueprint was not assembled from reports. It draws on more than seventeen years spent inside India's entrepreneurship and innovation ecosystem, building companies and products, running programmes across states and districts, working alongside first-time founders, researchers, students, investors and institutions, and watching ideas that began on the back of a notebook grow into companies of extraordinary scale.

The gaps described in these pages have been observed at close range. Many have been lived. We have seen where promising founders get stuck, where institutions fail to connect, where capital arrives too late or not at all, and where promising talent is lost simply because the right support was not available at the right moment.

India does not suffer from a shortage of ambition, ideas or talent. What its founders still need is a layer that connects, end to end, the many good things already built for them. The founders who make it today often do so by stitching that system together themselves, and they should not have to.

That is the specific problem this blueprint sets out to fix.

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1. Executive Summary

India presents a striking paradox. It runs the world's third-largest startup ecosystem, with over 2.2 lakh DPIIT-recognised startups reporting 23.36 lakh direct jobs as on 31 March 2026 (DPIIT), and a dense web of schemes covering seed funds, incubation, credit guarantees, research grants and mentorship portals. And yet youth unemployment sits at roughly three times the national average, graduate unemployment refuses to come down, and on Citigroup's 2024 estimate the economy needs to generate close to 12 million jobs a year to absorb new entrants, against eight to nine million generated at current growth rates. Government posts and corporate payrolls, put together, will never employ this cohort. Entrepreneurship and self-employment are the only channel with the scale to close the gap. This is no longer a startup-policy question. It is the central employment question before the country.

The problem is not a shortage of support. It is the shape of that support. India holds ideathons, disburses seed money, subsidises incubation, guarantees credit and runs mentorship portals, but each of these lives inside its own scheme, its own ministry, its own application form. Nothing connects one stage of a founder's journey to the next. A young person who wins an ideathon has no defined next step. A startup that receives a seed grant is not assigned a mentor to walk with it after the money arrives. A venture that survives to revenue has no structured route to its first big customer, to branding support, or to growth capital. Everything exists. The connections are the layer still to be built.

India has recognised this before, and has already begun. In September 2024 DPIIT launched BHASKAR, the Bharat Startup Knowledge Access Registry, which assigns a unique identity to every stakeholder in the ecosystem and carried over 7.4 lakh registered users as reported in mid-2026. It is the closest thing India has to the spine this paper proposes, and it demonstrates both the appetite for the idea and the precise limit of the current approach. Startup India's own guidance notes that the existing DPIIT recognition process continues in parallel with BHASKAR. A unique identity was created, and it became one more thing to register for rather than the thing that replaced registering. That gap between a registry and a rail is the subject of this paper.

This paper recommends a National Entrepreneurship Mission built around a stated national ambition, ten lakh new enterprises in five years, and a single organising idea: one doorway, one journey, one lifelong record. The Mission carries an aspirant from the first spark, or for the millions who have no idea yet from a district-specific Idea Bank, through validation, one-to-one mentorship supported by a multilingual AI co-pilot, incorporation, legal and professional support, market access and the first purchase order, branding and marketing, and on to the right form of growth capital for that kind of business: bank credit for some, procurement and exports for others, venture capital or the new RDI patient-capital pool for a few.

It requires no new scheme outlay. What it requires is the convergence of funds and programmes that already exist across DPIIT, DST, ANRF, MeitY, BIRAC, the MSME ministry, NITI Aayog and the financial-services system, onto one digital spine with one accountability framework. The Mission's own incremental cost is confined to three items: the Directorate, the digital spine built on the existing Startup India and BHASKAR stack, and the district Opportunity Map exercise. These should be costed explicitly at appraisal and are expected to be a small fraction of the converged capital they steward.

The design is not speculative. Every component proposed here has been run at national scale somewhere: the district advisory layer in Brazil and the United States, mentorship tied to private capital conviction in South Korea, statutory procurement set-asides in the United States, a fund-of-funds with a designed exit in Israel, and a legal right to a second attempt in South Korea. Section 7 sets out what each of those experiences teaches and, as importantly, where each of them failed. India built digital public infrastructure that let a billion people transact. The task now is to build entrepreneurial public infrastructure that lets millions create. This blueprint also proposes a more pivotal role for the Ministry of Education: entrepreneurship should enter the Ministry's charter as a flagship programme, so that the pipeline begins in classrooms rather than after them.

THE ASK, AT A GLANCE

Ambition: 10,00,000 new enterprises created and carried through a full support journey by 2031, with 6,00,000 surviving and revenue-earning at year three.

Architecture: one doorway, one Entrepreneurship Passport, district Opportunity Maps and a national Idea Bank, an AI co-pilot with human mentors at the decision points, structured demand-side access, and converged capital across ten fund-owning bodies.

The ask: notify the Mission as a centrally sponsored mission with a Directorate holding formal convergence mandates, and legislate the demand-side set-asides.

Cost: no new scheme outlay. Incremental cost limited to the Directorate, the digital spine and the Opportunity Map exercise, to be costed at appraisal.

Timeline: fifteen months from Cabinet approval to full national operation, with the ten lakh target accruing over the five years that follow.

North Star metric: sustainable enterprises created per crore of public expenditure, verified against GST and EPFO records rather than self-reported returns.

2. The Context: A Demographic Window That Is Closing

2.1 The employment arithmetic no longer works

Headline unemployment figures understate what is happening to India's young. The Periodic Labour Force Survey Annual Report 2025 places the unemployment rate for all persons aged 15 and above at 3.1 per cent, and for the 15 to 29 age group at 9.9 per cent. Urban youth unemployment stands at 13.6 per cent, down from 14.3 per cent a year earlier. Among graduates the picture is harsher. State of Working India 2026 finds unemployment of nearly 40 per cent among graduates aged 15 to 25 and 20 per cent among those aged 25 to 29, and reports that 1.1 crore of the 6.3 crore graduates aged 20 to 29 were unemployed in 2023, up from about 30 lakh in 2004. The share of graduates among unemployed youth in that age band has risen from 32 per cent to 67 per cent in two decades. The ILO and IHD India Employment Report 2024 reaches the same conclusion from a different angle: educated youth, those with secondary schooling or above, made up 65.7 per cent of India's unemployed youth in 2022, up from 35.2 per cent in 2000. The more educated the cohort, the worse its employment odds.

Behind these rates sits an arithmetic that no jobs scheme can beat, and a window that is closing faster than most policy assumes. India's 15 to 29 population grew from 185 million in 1983 to 357 million in 2023. It now peaks. State of Working India 2026 projects that this cohort will fall from roughly 367 million in 2026 to 245 million by 2036, and that the working-age share of the population will begin declining after 2030. The demographic dividend is not arriving. It is here, and it has about one cycle left to run.

That is what makes absorption urgent rather than merely important. Citigroup economists estimate that the economy must add close to 12 million jobs a year to absorb new entrants, against eight to nine million generated at a 7 per cent growth rate. The old two-employer model, a sarkari naukri or a private job, cannot close a gap of that size for a population this large. The third engine, mass entrepreneurship, has to be built deliberately, and it has to be built inside this decade. A mission that takes five years to show results has to start now or miss the window entirely.

2.2 The ecosystem is large, and it narrows sharply

At the top, India's ecosystem is world-class: over 2.2 lakh DPIIT-recognised startups reporting 23.36 lakh direct jobs as on 31 March 2026, with more than 55,200 startups recognised in FY26 alone, the highest single-year addition since Startup India began. Venture funding is recovering. Roughly half of all new startup activity now comes from tier-2 and tier-3 towns. DPIIT-recognised startups have filed more than 19,400 patent applications, and nearly 40,000 have been onboarded onto GeM.

Below the top, the funnel narrows sharply. Industry data from Tracxn put India's total startup population at more than 6.87 lakh, against 2.2 lakh that have sought DPIIT recognition and roughly 34,400 that have raised institutional funding. The overwhelming majority of aspirants never enter the formal ecosystem at all, and formal closure data does not capture what happens to them. MCA records 6,789 recognised startups as dissolved or struck off, a figure that measures formal dissolution rather than abandonment, dormancy or quiet winding down, and that says nothing at all about the far larger population outside recognition.

What the evidence does show is where ventures break. The most systematic Indian study available, an analysis of post-mortem accounts from 165 failed Indian startups published in the Indian Growth and Development Review in 2023, found the three leading causes to be financing at 27 per cent of recorded occurrences, sales and marketing at 25 per cent, and the fundamental business idea at 16 per cent. It is a narrative analysis of a convenience sample rather than a representative survey, and India lacks a definitive study of the question. Establishing one from DPIIT and MCA data should itself be an early Mission workstream.

Read that carefully, because it is the finding on which this entire blueprint rests. Money matters, and it is the single most cited cause of failure. But the second largest killer is one that money does not fix. A venture that runs out of cash because it never found its customer has a go-to-market problem, not a capital problem, and writing it a larger cheque would not have saved it. Together these two causes account for more than half of all recorded failures, and they are precisely the two things India’s support architecture funds separately and never bundles.

The international evidence points the same way. A World Bank review of business training evaluations across the developing world found modest effects of training alone on the survival of existing firms, but stronger evidence that training helps prospective owners launch faster. A World Bank meta-regression across 37 impact evaluations found that a package of training and financing together is more effective than either on its own. Capital without complements does not create surviving enterprises. Complements without capital do not either. The gap in India is not the absence of the pieces. It is that nothing joins them.

3. The Diagnosis: Everything Exists, But in Silos

Map India’s support architecture against the actual life of a first-time founder and a consistent pattern appears. Interventions exist at nearly every stage. Each is a standalone programme with its own gatekeeping. And none hands the founder forward to the next stage.

Stage of the journey	Existing intervention(s)	What is missing
Spark / aspiration	Ideathons, hackathons, Atal Tinkering Labs, awareness campaigns	No defined pathway once the event ends. The winner of an ideathon has nowhere to go on Monday morning.
Idea discovery	Almost nothing	Millions want to do something but do not know what. India has no public system that helps a person without an idea find one.
School and college pipeline (Ministry of Education)	NEP 2020 provisions for experiential and vocational learning; Institution’s Innovation Councils under the MoE Innovation Cell	NEP’s entrepreneurship intent has not become a graded, credit-earning outcome at scale. MoE’s own IIC data shows wide variation in activity across institutions.
Idea refinement and validation	Incubators, NIDHI-PRAYAS, some university E-cells	Access is limited, urban and selective. There is no universal doubt-solving or one-to-one guidance channel.
Seed capital	SISFS (Rs 945 crore corpus), state seed funds, AIM grants	Money reaches the founder. There is no stay-with-the-founder layer after disbursal, and mentorship is not linked to funding.
Incorporation and compliance	MCA SPICe+ portal, DPIIT recognition, tax exemptions	The founder navigates legal, CA/CS, IP and labour compliance alone, or pays private advisors he cannot afford.
Business building and mentorship	MAARG mentorship portal, incubator networks	Mentorship is voluntary and thin. No funded startup has an assigned mentor accountable for defined milestones.
Ecosystem identity and discovery	BHASKAR (launched September 2024), which issues a unique ID to every stakeholder and had over 7.4 lakh registered users as reported in mid-2026	BHASKAR is a discovery and networking registry. It holds no milestone record, no funding history and no outcome data, and DPIIT recognition continues to run in parallel with it. The identity exists. Nothing travels on it.
Market access	GeM, ONDC, trade fairs; nearly 40,000 startups onboarded onto GeM	Onboarding is not procurement. There is no set-aside, no first-customer obligation on buyers, and no connection back to the earlier stages.
Branding and marketing	Almost nothing in public programmes	Absent from the public architecture, although weak go-to-market is the second largest recorded cause of Indian startup failure.
Growth capital	Fund of Funds (FFS and now FoF 2.0) via SIDBI, CGSS guarantees, the RDI Fund	No pipeline connects government-seeded ventures to FFS-backed investors. Discovery depends on personal networks.

Stage of the journey	Existing intervention(s)	What is missing
Accountability of public money	Utilisation certificates, incubator reports, self-reported jobs data	Compliance is documentary and outcomes are self-declared. Whether the venture survived, hired or earned is not verified against GST or EPFO records.

Three consequences follow.

- **Access inequity.** The already-networked navigate the maze best. Founders from metros, elite institutes and business families stitch the silos together privately. A first-generation aspirant in a district town cannot, and that is precisely the person a national programme must serve.
- **Capital travels without stewardship.** Public money is disbursed with sincerity but without an after-care layer. Seed grants are audited for utilisation certificates rather than for survival or jobs. The system measures inputs more thoroughly than outcomes, understandably, since inputs are the easier half to measure.
- **The journey has no single owner.** Each scheme optimises its own numbers, applications processed, funds disbursed, events held, while the metric that matters most, surviving job-creating enterprises per rupee of public money, is nobody's specific mandate.

WHY BHASKAR MATTERS TO THIS ARGUMENT

BHASKAR is the most important precedent this Mission has. It establishes that DPIIT has already reached the central conclusion of this paper: the ecosystem needs one identity. The architecture proposed here starts from that conclusion rather than arguing for it. Figures below are as reported in mid-2026.

What BHASKAR clarifies is the distinction between a registry and a rail. A registry lets people find each other. A rail lets something travel along it. Aadhaar mattered not because it listed citizens but because eligibility, subsidy and authentication began to move on it.

BHASKAR today carries a profile and enables discovery, which is precisely what a registry is designed to do. The Mission needs that same identity to carry a record as well: milestones, funding history, repayment behaviour, revenue, jobs and closures. Until it does, DPIIT recognition, SISFS applications, MAARG mentorship and state schemes will continue to run on separate forms alongside it.

The proposal is therefore not to build a second BHASKAR. It is to give the identity BHASKAR has already created something to carry, and to make the converged schemes read from it.

4. The Ambition: Mission 10 Lakh Entrepreneurs

Skill India set out to train a stated number of people. Digital India set out to connect a stated number of citizens. Jan Dhan set out to open a stated number of accounts. Missions of national scale begin with a number, because a number forces the machinery to organise around outcomes rather than activity. Entrepreneurship policy in India has never had one. This blueprint proposes it: ten lakh new enterprises created and carried through a full support journey over five years.

Five-year target (indicative, to be firmed at appraisal)	Number
New enterprises taken through the full Mission pathway	10,00,000
Enterprises surviving and revenue-earning at the end of year three	6,00,000
Direct jobs created (founders plus employees)	30 to 36 lakh
Enterprises graduating into DPIIT-recognised startups	1,00,000
Districts with a live Entrepreneurship Opportunity Map	All 800+
Share of enterprises from non-metro districts	At least 60%

The North Star metric. Every existing scheme reports what it spent and how many applications it processed. The Mission should be judged on one number above all others:

sustainable enterprises created per crore of public expenditure, where "sustainable" means alive, revenue-earning and employing at least one person beyond the founder at the end of year three. Every design choice in the sections that follow exists to move that one number.

Measured, not declared. India's existing startup employment figures are self-reported by the ventures themselves. That is the honest weakness in every number the ecosystem currently publishes, including the ones cited in this paper. The Mission should be the first Indian programme to break that pattern by verifying survival, revenue and employment against GST filings and EPFO records rather than against forms. This is the one place where India's digital public infrastructure can solve a measurement problem no other country has solved, and it costs almost nothing because the data already exists. A Mission that can prove its outcomes is worth more than one that can only assert them.

The missing ingredient: empathy for the founder. One more gap deserves naming. Founders often describe a change in how they are treated once a cheque, public or private, clears: less as builders to be backed, more as line items to be monitored. Capital providers do not always look at the people they fund with the respect the act of building deserves. The Mission treats founder dignity as a design requirement, not a nicety: mentor and investor conduct codes on the empanelled network, review formats that begin with what the founder is attempting rather than what the founder owes, and public celebration of honest attempts alongside successes. A founder who is respected stays in the game longer than one who is merely financed.

5. The Architecture: One Doorway, One Journey, One Record

The Mission is not a new scheme competing with existing ones. It is the connective tissue that joins them: a single national doorway through which any aspirant enters, a stage-gated journey that carries them forward automatically, and a lifelong record that follows them across ventures. Its main design elements are set out below.

5.1 The district as the operating unit

National programmes are designed at the centre, and their benefits tend to be absorbed most easily in a few metros. The Mission adds a layer beneath them: its basic operating unit is the district. Every district gets an Entrepreneurship Opportunity Map, prepared once and refreshed annually, answering plain questions. What does this district produce? What does it import that could be made locally? Where are its openings in agriculture, tourism, manufacturing, services and digital work? And crucially, which businesses can realistically be built here with one lakh, five lakh, twenty-five lakh or one crore rupees? Anyone who has done fieldwork across Indian districts knows that opportunity is everywhere but legibility is nowhere. A young person in Motihari or Barmer cannot see the businesses hiding in plain sight around him. The Opportunity Map makes them visible. It shifts the Mission from passively waiting for people with startup ideas to actively identifying where enterprises and jobs can be created, district by district.

This layer needs an owner and a funding line, not goodwill. Section 7 sets out how Brazil and the United States solved exactly this problem: the United States hosts its 1,100 advisory centres inside universities and state agencies rather than building a central cadre, and Brazil is reported to fund its network of nearly 700 centres through a dedicated payroll levy rather than an annual budget negotiation. India should host the Opportunity Map function inside District Industries Centres and lead bank offices that already exist, and name its funding source explicitly at appraisal.

5.2 The Idea Bank: for those who want to build but do not know what

Most entrepreneurship programmes today begin with an unstated filter: bring us your idea. Millions of young Indians fall outside that filter before they start. They have energy, hunger and often some capital, and they will tell you honestly, "I want to do something, but I don’t know what." The Mission answers them with a national Idea Bank, seeded from the district Opportunity Maps: a searchable library of validated, localised business templates, each with a model plan, realistic capital requirement, licensing checklist, supplier and buyer leads, and the names of people already running such a business two districts away. The message this sends is the doorway’s most important one. You do not need to arrive with an idea. The Mission can help you find one.

5.3 Many tracks, many destinations: not everyone is chasing a unicorn

Startup policy in India has tilted towards the venture-capital end of the spectrum, and that shapes who feels invited. A five-lakh-rupee food-processing unit in Champaran should not be pushed through the same journey as an AI startup raising a Series A, and its success should not be measured against the same yardstick. The Mission therefore runs distinct tracks with distinct destinations. Venture capital is one destination among several. Profitability, bank credit, government procurement, exports and franchising are equally honourable exits from the pipeline, and for most of the ten lakh, more probable ones.

Track	Typical ticket size	Realistic destination
Micro and small local businesses	Rs 1 to 10 lakh	Profitability, bank credit, franchising
Women-led enterprises	Rs 1 to 25 lakh	Formalisation, procurement, digital commerce

Track	Typical ticket size	Realistic destination
Rural and agri enterprises	Rs 5 to 50 lakh	FPO linkages, exports, food processing chains
Student founders	Rs 1 to 25 lakh	First revenue, campus-to-company transition
Innovation and technology startups	Rs 25 lakh to Rs 5 crore	Angel and venture capital, FFS-backed AIFs
Deep-tech and research ventures	Rs 1 to 50 crore	ANRF grants, RDI Fund patient capital
Existing MSMEs seeking scale	Rs 25 lakh to Rs 10 crore	RAMP support, CGTMSE credit, export markets

5.4 An AI co-pilot for every founder, human mentors where they matter

The honest objection to one-to-one mentorship at national scale has always been arithmetic: ten lakh founders would need millions of mentor-hours that do not exist. Technology narrows that constraint considerably. Every enrolled entrepreneur gets a multilingual AI co-pilot, available round the clock, for the work that consumes most mentor time today: idea discovery from the Idea Bank, business-plan drafting, unit economics, scheme and subsidy discovery, compliance calendars, basic market research, pitch preparation and follow-up between mentor sessions. Human mentors are then reserved for the moments where judgement and lived experience actually matter: validating a pivot, negotiating a term sheet, handling the first big customer, deciding when to shut down. MeitY's IndiaAI infrastructure is the natural place to build it.

Two limits must be stated plainly rather than discovered later. First, the co-pilot advises and does not certify. Where a wrong answer carries legal or financial consequence, licensing requirements, tax positions, labour compliance or contract terms, the co-pilot routes the founder to an empanelled professional rather than answering. A first-generation founder acting on a confidently wrong compliance answer can lose their savings, and the Mission cannot design that risk in. Second, the co-pilot does not replace the assigned human mentor for funded ventures. It makes that mentor affordable at scale by removing the routine work, which is a different claim from replacing them.

5.5 The demand side: do not just fund enterprises, create customers for them

Ask any founder who has survived the first two years and most will say the same thing: the first purchase order changed more than the first grant. Indian policy pours effort into the supply side of entrepreneurship and almost none into demand. The Mission corrects this as a matter of principle.

Onboarding is not procurement. Nearly 40,000 startups are already on GeM, and that has not translated into a structured route to a first buyer, because nothing obliges anyone to buy. The United States has run the alternative since the Small Business Act: a statutory goal that small businesses receive 23 per cent of federal prime contract dollars, which the federal government exceeded in FY25 at nearly 28 per cent, or roughly 179 billion dollars. The instrument that makes it work is not the target but the enforcement architecture around it: sub-goals for specific categories, and an annual published scorecard that grades every agency from A+ to F.

India should adopt the same three features. A statutory set-aside on GeM for qualifying Mission enterprises, not a guideline. Within it, a geographic sub-goal for enterprises from non-metro districts, modelled on the United States HUBZone category, which is the instrument this paper's 60 per cent non-metro ambition currently lacks. And an annual published scorecard grading every central ministry and PSU against its first-customer target, district by district. Simplified vendor registration, faster payment terms enforced through the MSME Samadhaan machinery, ONDC on-boarding, export-council handholding and organised buyer-seller melas at the district level complete the picture. Alongside this sits the piece missing entirely from today's architecture: an empanelled panel of branding, design and digital-marketing agencies whose services early ventures can draw against a capped voucher. A venture that cannot be found by its customers fails just as surely as one that runs out of cash.

5.6 Education that ends in a sale, not a paper

The NEP 2020 opening for credit-bearing entrepreneurship courses should be pushed one step further than syllabus design. Students should not merely study entrepreneurship; the course should end in doing it. A semester-long capstone in which a student identifies a real problem, validates demand with real potential customers, builds something, a product, a service, a stall, a page, and attempts a first sale. The examination is not a written paper. The examination is whether you created value a customer paid for. Even a failed attempt, honestly documented, teaches more than any textbook and feeds directly into the student's Entrepreneurship Passport. Rolled out through AICTE, UGC, NCVET and the ITI system, this converts the spark stage from an events calendar into a population-scale pipeline.

5.7 The Entrepreneurship Passport, and the right to a second attempt

The single founder identity at the heart of the Mission should be more than a login. It should be a lifelong digital record, an Entrepreneurship Passport, carrying courses completed, ideas tested, mentor milestones, ventures founded, grants and loans received, repayment behaviour, revenue milestones, jobs created, and, deliberately, ventures that failed.

THE PASSPORT AND BHASKAR: WHAT IS DIFFERENT

The Passport does not replace BHASKAR. It should be built on it, and the BHASKAR ID should become the Entrepreneurship Passport number so that 7.4 lakh existing users migrate rather than re-register.

What changes is what the identity carries. BHASKAR holds a profile. The Passport holds a record: milestones, disbursals, repayment behaviour, revenue, jobs, and closures.

What changes is what the identity does. BHASKAR enables discovery. The Passport carries eligibility, so that a founder proves a fact once and every converged scheme can see it, instead of re-proving it on a fresh form each time.

What changes is the parallel track. DPIIT recognition, SISFS, MAARG and state schemes should read from and write to the Passport rather than run alongside it. This is the single most important design decision in the Mission, and it is a governance decision more than a technical one.

The second element of the Passport is the one that changes what the state is actually doing. In every mature entrepreneurial economy, failure is part of the funnel, and the average successful founder is on a second or third attempt. In India, a failed first venture resets a person to zero in the eyes of every scheme and most lenders. The Passport reverses that logic. A serious, responsibly closed first attempt should raise entrepreneurial credibility, not erase it. Founders whose ventures die honestly keep their full learning history, return to the Idea Bank, and re-enter the pipeline on accelerated terms. This one design choice means the state stops funding companies and starts developing entrepreneurs.

South Korea has just tested this proposition, and its experience carries a warning India should heed rather than repeat. In December 2025 the Korean National Assembly amended the Act on the Promotion of Venture Investment to ban joint liability clauses that held founders personally accountable for venture losses, and the Ministry of SMEs and Startups expanded its re-startup funds around a stated second-chance policy. The law changed. The financial plumbing did not follow. Korea sees more than 3,500 bankruptcy and rehabilitation applications a year, while guarantee programmes for restart businesses number in the single digits annually, because the ladder connecting policy loans to guarantees and investment for recovering founders does not function.

The lesson is that a record of honest failure is worth nothing unless somebody is obliged to treat it as an asset. The Mission therefore pairs the Passport with two operational commitments. First, a defined re-entry pathway in which CGTMSE, MUDRA and SISFS treat a responsibly closed first venture as a positive credential with a published weighting, not as a neutral fact and never as a negative one. Second, an exit rail. India currently makes it slow, costly and undignified to close a company, which means most failed ventures are abandoned rather than closed, and an abandoned venture cannot be honestly documented. The Mission should route Mission enterprises into the fast-track strike-off route and the pre-packaged insolvency framework for MSMEs, with the professional costs covered by the same voucher that funded incorporation. A state that helps a founder start and then abandons them at the exit has not built a journey. It has built a trapdoor.

6. Converging India’s Scattered Capital: One Spine, Many Funds

The most common objection to any new mission is money. Here the money already exists, in quantities India has never before directed at innovation and enterprise, but it sits in a dozen unconnected pools. The Rs 1 lakh crore RDI Fund, approved by Cabinet on 1 July 2025, anchored by DST as nodal ministry and operationalised through a Special Purpose Fund under ANRF, has begun sanctioning patient capital: TDB and BIRAC were approved as the first Second Level Fund Managers in January 2026, and TDB had cleared 22 projects by mid-2026. ANRF carries a Rs 50,000 crore mandate for 2023 to 2028, of which roughly Rs 14,000 crore is budgeted from government and the balance is to be mobilised from industry and philanthropy, so it is a mobilisation target rather than a committed pool. DPIIT runs SISFS, CGSS and the Fund of Funds, now supplemented by FoF 2.0 with a Rs 10,000 crore corpus notified in April 2026 and extended to deeptech AIFs, micro VCs and tech-driven manufacturing. MeitY runs TIDE, SAMRIDH, GENESIS and the IndiaAI Mission. DST runs the NIDHI family. BIRAC runs BIG. The MSME ministry runs PMEGP, RAMP and CGTMSE. SIDBI and the banks run MUDRA and Stand-Up India.

Each fund covers a stage or a sector. None of them shares a founder record with any other. A deep-tech founder today can be simultaneously eligible for four of these and aware of one.

The Mission’s proposal is convergence, not merger. Every fund keeps its ownership, mandate and budget line. What they share is the spine: one Entrepreneurship Passport, one milestone record, one outcome dashboard. When a Mission venture crosses a defined milestone, its founder-consented record becomes visible to every converged fund whose mandate it fits, and eligibility travels with the founder instead of being re-proven on a fresh form each time. The table below maps the converged architecture.

Ministry / body	Instruments today	Role inside the Mission
DPIIT (Commerce and Industry)	Startup India, BHASKAR, SISFS, Fund of Funds (FFS and FoF 2.0), CGSS, MAARG	Mission Directorate; seed capital and recognition; mentorship backbone; BHASKAR ID becomes the Entrepreneurship Passport
DST	NIDHI (PRAYAS, Seed Support, EIR, TBIs); nodal ministry for the RDI Scheme	Technology incubation track; bridge into RDI patient capital
ANRF	Rs 50,000 crore mandate (2023 to 2028); custodian of the Rs 1 lakh crore RDI Special Purpose Fund	Research-to-venture pathway; deep-tech track growth capital
MeitY	TIDE 2.0, SAMRIDH, GENESIS, IndiaAI Mission	Digital and AI ventures; the Mission’s AI co-pilot infrastructure
DBT / BIRAC	BIG grants, BioNEST incubators; RDI Second Level Fund Manager	Biotech and life-sciences track
NITI Aayog / AIM	Atal Tinkering Labs, Atal Incubation Centres	The spark stage; school and community entry points
Ministry of MSME	PMEGP, RAMP, CGTMSE, ZED certification, Samadhaan	Micro-enterprise and MSME-scaling tracks; payment enforcement
DFS / SIDBI / banks	MUDRA, Stand-Up India, priority-sector credit	Debt pathway for non-VC tracks; second-attempt re-entry lending
Ministry of Agriculture	RKVY agri-business incubation (RAFTAAR)	Rural and agri-enterprise track
MSDE / NCVET	Skill India, PMKVY, ITIs	Entrepreneurship curriculum and trade-linked ventures

Ministry / body	Instruments today	Role inside the Mission
MCA / GSTN / EPFO	SPICe+, GST filings, EPFO records	Verified outcome measurement; fast-track exit rail

Convergence also addresses the gap flagged at the start of this paper: adding stewardship to money. Under the Mission, every rupee of converged public capital travels with an assigned mentor, tranche-linked milestones and outcome tracking on the shared dashboard. This is not surveillance of founders. It is the same discipline a good investor brings, extended to public money, protecting the founder from the known causes of early failure and protecting the taxpayer by turning blind grants into managed capital. Over time, budget flows should increasingly favour this stewarded pipeline.

Two design features from abroad should be built into the capital architecture rather than added later. Israel's Yozma fund-of-funds, launched in 1993 with 100 million dollars, gave private partners the option to buy out the government's 40 per cent stake after five years at cost plus nominal interest. Most exercised it, the ten funds were fully privatised, and by the early 2000s Israel's venture market ran without government participation at all. FFS has no equivalent sunset or buyout structure, and it should. Separately, Korea's TIPS programme requires startups to repay 10 per cent of R&D support on commercial success, with no repayment if the venture fails. That is a cleaner accountability instrument than a utilisation certificate, because it aligns the state with the outcome rather than with the paperwork.

7. What the Evidence From Other Countries Shows

No country has run an entrepreneurship mission at India's scale, because none has India's cohort size. That is not a weakness in this proposal. It is the reason it exists. But every individual component proposed here has been run somewhere, some of it for fifty years, and the record is instructive both where it succeeded and where it did not.

One caution on how to read what follows. Israel and Estonia are small, high-skill, export-oriented economies, and lifting their models wholesale into a country of 1.4 billion would be a category error. The comparators have therefore been matched to the tracks they actually fit: Brazil and the United States for the mass, non-venture, district-level layer where roughly nine in ten of the ten lakh will sit; South Korea for the innovation and deep-tech tracks; Israel for the fund architecture alone; Estonia for the digital spine. Matching the comparator to the track is itself an argument for the multi-track design set out in Section 5.3.

7.1 The district layer: Brazil and the United States have run this for decades

The district advisory layer proposed in Section 5.1 is the least novel idea in this paper, which is precisely its recommendation. The United States established its Small Business Development Center network under the Small Business Administration in the mid-1970s. It now operates more than 1,100 service centres across all fifty states and assists over one million clients a year. The design feature worth copying is that centres are hosted by universities and state agencies rather than staffed by a federal cadre, which is how a national programme achieves district presence without building a new bureaucracy.

Brazil is the closer analogue to a ten lakh ambition, because Sebrae serves micro and small business rather than startups. Founded in 1972, it runs a network of nearly 700 on-site service centres with more than five thousand specialists and a large external consultant pool. And it answers the question this paper must not avoid: Sebrae is reported to be financed by a compulsory contribution on Brazilian payrolls, currently cited at 0.3 per cent, rather than by an annual budget negotiation. The exact rate should be confirmed against Sebrae's own disclosures before the mechanism is cited in any formal submission.

What India should take from this. Host the district function inside institutions that already exist, and name a funding mechanism. A convergence directorate with no dedicated money has no leverage over ten fund-owning bodies. India does not need a new levy, but the Mission must state at appraisal where the district layer's permanent funding comes from, or that layer will quietly not happen.

7.2 Mentorship tied to funding: South Korea inverted the sequence

Section 5.4 promises an assigned, milestone-accountable mentor for every funded venture. At ten lakh scale that promise is difficult to administer and easy to fake. South Korea faced the same problem and solved it by changing who decides.

Under TIPS, the Tech Incubator Program for Startups, the government does not select most startups. Accredited venture firms and accelerators, designated as TIPS operators, make the first investment decision with their own capital. Public R&D and commercialisation support follows that private validation, and is reported to reach up to roughly one billion Korean won in combined support over three years. Mentor accountability is not enforced by contract. It is enforced by the mentor having money in the deal.

Two further details are worth lifting. Startups repay 10 per cent of R&D support on commercial success and nothing if the venture fails, which is a sharper accountability instrument than a utilisation certificate. And the programme is deliberately small and selective: TIPS is reported to have supported around 520 startups in 2025, with a planned expansion in 2026. That is a feature, not a limitation, and it supports this paper's multi-track argument. The TIPS model belongs on the innovation and deep-tech tracks. It does not belong on the micro-enterprise track, where the destination is profitability and bank credit rather than venture capital.

7.3 The demand side: the United States has a statute where India has an aspiration

The demand-side argument in Section 5.5 is this paper's most original claim and currently its softest instrument. The American version has been law since the Small Business Act and it works. In FY25 the federal government exceeded its statutory 23 per cent small business prime contracting goal by awarding nearly 28 per cent, roughly 179 billion dollars, with combined prime and subcontract awards approaching 273 billion dollars against total federal contract spending of about 793 billion dollars. It has exceeded the goal for three consecutive years.

Three features make it work, and all three are missing from India's current arrangement. The goal is statutory rather than aspirational, so it cannot be quietly dropped. There are category sub-goals underneath the headline number, including HUBZone, a geographic set-aside for historically underutilised business zones, which is the direct model for a non-metro sub-goal in India. And the SBA publishes an annual scorecard grading every federal agency, which is what converts a target into a behaviour.

The honest caveat strengthens rather than weakens the case, and should be stated in any presentation of this paper: women-owned small businesses in the United States continue to fall short of their statutory sub-target even as the overall goal is exceeded. Set-asides work in aggregate and under-deliver on specific categories. A design that assumes otherwise will be embarrassed by its own data.

7.4 Growth capital: Israel designed an exit that India has not

Israel launched Yozma in 1993 with 100 million dollars of public money, structured as a fund-of-funds. The government took a 40 per cent equity stake in ten new venture funds, each required to include a foreign venture firm as a limited partner, and gave private partners the option to buy that stake out after five years at cost plus nominal interest. Most exercised the option. All ten funds were privatised, and by the early 2000s Israel's venture market operated with no direct government participation, a situation that held for more than two decades until a new Yozma edition was announced in 2024.

The lesson for India is not to build a fund of funds, which India already has and has just expanded through FoF 2.0. It is that Yozma had a designed exit and a mechanism that handed the upside to private managers, which is why it crowded capital in rather than substituting for it. India's FFS has no equivalent sunset or buyout structure. Adding one is a technical, low-cost, credible recommendation of exactly the kind that gets a paper taken seriously by the finance side of government.

7.5 The digital spine: Estonia is the benchmark, and BHASKAR is the Indian starting point

Estonia makes every government service available online and approves online company registration within 24 to 48 hours for a state fee of 265 euros. It is useful here as a benchmark rather than a model, because a country of 1.3 million and a country of 1.4 billion do not face the same problem. What Estonia proves is that a single lifelong business identity is not speculative.

India's starting point is better than it is usually given credit for. BHASKAR already exists, already issues a unique ID and already has over 7.4 lakh registered users. What India has not yet done is make anything travel on that identity, which is the distinction between a registry and a rail described in Section 3. The Mission's work here is migration and obligation, not construction.

7.6 The second attempt: South Korea changed the law and the plumbing did not follow

Section 5.7 sets out the Korean case in detail, and it is the single most useful cautionary example available to this paper. Korea banned founder joint liability by legislation in December 2025 and built a stated second-chance policy around re-startup funds. Yet Korean press reporting in early 2026 put restart guarantee programmes in the single digits annually against more than 3,500 bankruptcy and rehabilitation applications a year. Korea changed the law and the culture, and the credit machinery still did not treat a failed founder as fundable.

Building India's Next 10 Lakh Entrepreneurs

What India should take from this. A Passport entry recording an honest failure is decorative unless a lender, a guarantee fund and a scheme are each obliged to weigh it. Build the obligation at the same time as the record, not afterwards.

7.7 What the impact evidence says about programmes like this one

The rigorous evaluation literature on entrepreneurship programmes is not flattering, and this paper is stronger for citing it rather than avoiding it. A World Bank review of business training evaluations across the developing world found modest effects of training alone on the survival of existing firms, with stronger evidence that training helps prospective owners launch faster. A World Bank meta-regression across 37 impact evaluations found that training alone produced improvements in knowledge and practice without immediate translation into business creation or income, and that a package of training plus financing was materially more effective than either component on its own. The same analysis found that involving the private sector in programme delivery improves effectiveness.

Read together, those findings are the case for this Mission stated by its most sceptical possible source. Training alone does not work. Money alone does not work. Bundles work better, and they work better still when private actors are inside the delivery. That is the whole architecture of this paper, and it means the design rests on the evidence rather than on assertion.

Design element	Precedent	What India should adopt
District operating unit	US SBDC network, 1,100+ centres, 1 million clients a year; Brazil Sebrae, nearly 700 centres funded by a 0.3% payroll levy	Host inside DICs and lead banks rather than a new cadre; name a permanent funding source at appraisal
Mentorship tied to capital	Korea TIPS: private accelerators invest first, public support follows; 10% success-contingent repayment	Apply to the innovation and deep-tech tracks; let private conviction, not a contract, enforce mentor accountability
Demand side	US Small Business Act: 23% statutory goal, nearly 28% achieved in FY25; HUBZone geographic sub-goal; published agency scorecards	Statutory GeM set-aside, a non-metro sub-goal, and an annual published ministry scorecard
Growth capital	Israel Yozma 1993: 40% government stake with a five-year buyout option; full privatisation within seven years	Add a sunset and buyout structure to FFS and FoF 2.0
Digital spine	Estonia: company registration in 24 to 48 hours, all services online	Migrate BHASKAR IDs into the Passport and require converged schemes to read from it
Second attempt	Korea 2025: joint liability banned by law, but restart guarantees remain in single digits annually	Build the lending obligation and the exit rail at the same time as the record
Evidence base	World Bank reviews and meta-regression across 37 evaluations	Bundle training with financing and put private actors inside delivery

8. The Policy Actions Required

1. **Notify the National Entrepreneurship Mission** as a centrally sponsored mission with a dedicated Directorate under DPIIT, holding formal convergence mandates over the eleven fund-owning and record-holding bodies mapped in Section 6, and over state startup missions willing to join the spine. Give the Directorate a dedicated budget line, because a convergence mandate without money has no leverage.

2. **Build the Entrepreneurship Passport on BHASKAR rather than beside it.** Convert the BHASKAR ID into the Passport number so existing users migrate rather than re-register, extend it from a profile to a record carrying milestones, disbursals, repayment behaviour, revenue, jobs and closures, and mandate that DPIIT recognition, SISFS, MAARG and converged state schemes read from and write to it instead of running in parallel. All empanelment of mentors, incubators, professionals, marketing agencies and investors lives on this spine.

3. **Commission District Entrepreneurship Opportunity Maps** for all districts and build the national Idea Bank on top of them, hosted inside District Industries Centres and lead bank offices, with local industry bodies as co-authors and a named permanent funding source.

4. **Amend SISFS and analogous seed instruments** so that one-to-one mentorship is a condition of disbursal, with the AI co-pilot handling routine guidance in between. On the innovation and deep-tech tracks, adopt the TIPS structure instead: let accredited private accelerators invest first and have public support follow that conviction, with a success-contingent repayment replacing the utilisation certificate.

5. **Institutionalise professional support as an entitlement:** empanelled CA, CS, legal and IP professionals delivering incorporation, compliance and contracts to Mission ventures at regulated rates for the first twenty-four months, against capped vouchers.

6. **Legislate the demand side.** A statutory GeM set-aside for Mission enterprises rather than a guideline, a geographic sub-goal for non-metro districts modelled on the United States HUBZone category, annual first-customer targets for central ministries and PSUs, an annual published scorecard grading every ministry against them, enforced payment timelines, and branding and marketing as fundable line items through empanelled agencies.

7. **Build the capital bridges track by track:** curated Mission deal flow that FFS and FoF 2.0 backed AIFs are required to review; a route from the deep-tech track into ANRF grants and RDI Fund instruments through TDB and BIRAC as designated Second Level Fund Managers; MUDRA, Stand-Up India and CGTMSE as the default credit pathway for the non-VC tracks. Add a Yozma-style sunset and buyout structure so public capital has a designed exit.

8. **Create the exit rail and the second-attempt obligation together.** Route Mission enterprises into fast-track strike-off and the pre-packaged insolvency framework for MSMEs with professional costs covered by the incorporation voucher, and require CGTMSE, MUDRA and SISFS to publish the positive weighting they give a responsibly closed first venture. Korea legislated the right to fail and left the credit machinery untouched. India should not repeat that sequence.

9. **Shift budgeting from disbursal-linked to outcome-linked** across all converged schemes, with funding, incubator and mentor empanelment renewals tied to survival rates, jobs, revenue and follow-on capital, verified against GST and EPFO records rather than self-reported returns, and published annually district by district.

10. **Embed the build-and-sell capstone** in the education system under NEP 2020, through AICTE, UGC, NCVET and the ITI network, and adopt entrepreneurship into the Ministry of Education’s charter as a flagship programme, so the spark stage feeds the Mission at population scale.

9. Expected Outcomes

- **For employment:** a structural channel converting job seekers into job creators. Six lakh surviving enterprises employing an average of four to five people each imply 24 to 30 lakh jobs beyond the founders, or 30 to 36 lakh livelihoods in total, without a single new government post.
- **For public finance:** a measurable target of at least 60 sustainable enterprises per Rs 1 crore of Mission-linked expenditure, against a baseline that is today unmeasured because no Indian scheme currently tracks survival. At that ratio, six lakh surviving enterprises imply roughly Rs 10,000 crore of Mission running expenditure over five years, or about Rs 1.67 lakh per surviving enterprise. This is a demanding target and appraisal should test it directly; if the true cost per surviving enterprise proves higher, the honest response is to revise the ratio rather than the definition of survival.
- **For private capital:** a curated pipeline of 1,00,000 startup-grade ventures for FFS, FoF 2.0 and RDI-backed funds, targeted to catalyse about Rs 50,000 crore of follow-on private capital over five years. That is roughly a 3x multiple on the converged public seed capital flowing into Mission ventures through SISFS, FFS, FoF 2.0 and RDI instruments, which is a separate quantity from the Mission's own running cost in the preceding bullet. Both figures should be stated separately at appraisal.
- **For output:** six lakh surviving enterprises at a modest average turnover of Rs 50 lakh imply about Rs 3 lakh crore of annual economic activity. Against nominal GDP of Rs 346 lakh crore in FY26 (MoSPI provisional estimates) and, on an assumption of 9 to 10 per cent nominal growth, roughly Rs 530 to 560 lakh crore by 2031, that is of the order of 0.5 to 0.6 per cent of GDP, before counting second-order activity in supplier and distribution chains. The GDP projection is an assumption of this paper, not a published forecast.
- **For measurement:** the first Indian programme whose outcome claims are verified against GST and EPFO records rather than self-declared. This is a smaller-sounding outcome than the others and may prove the most durable, because it changes what every future scheme can be held to.

10. Implementation Roadmap: A 15-Month Fast Track

A mission of this kind is usually given five years. It does not need them. Nearly every component already exists, the schemes, the portals, the funds, the incubator network, the education regulators, and BHASKAR has already established the identity layer. What is being built is the connecting tissue, which is software, rules and governance rather than brick and mortar. The timeline below compresses launch to full operation into fifteen months. Two items on it depend on Parliament rather than on the Directorate, the statutory GeM set-aside and the exit-rail amendments, and should be pursued in parallel rather than treated as blockers to the rest.

Horizon	Milestones
0 to 3 months	Cabinet approval; Mission Directorate constituted under DPIIT with a dedicated budget line; inter-ministerial convergence framework notified with all eleven bodies; Entrepreneurship Passport specification issued and BHASKAR ID migration commissioned on the existing Startup India stack; GST and EPFO data-sharing protocols agreed with MCA, GSTN and EPFO; empanelment norms for mentors and professional-service providers issued.

Horizon	Milestones
3 to 6 months	Pilot live in 100 districts, at least 60 per cent non-metro; District Entrepreneurship Opportunity Maps and Idea Bank v1 published for pilot districts; AI co-pilot launched in eight languages with professional-referral routing for compliance questions; SISFS and MAARG guideline amendments notified making milestone-linked mentorship a condition of disbursal; TIPS-style operator accreditation opened for the innovation and deep-tech tracks; first GeM set-asides and first-customer targets notified.
6 to 12 months	All-district rollout; Entrepreneurship Passport fully live and portable, with DPIIT recognition and converged schemes reading from it rather than running in parallel; build-and-sell capstone introduced through AICTE, UGC and NCVET from the next academic session; exit rail operational through fast-track strike-off and pre-packaged insolvency; national demo-day calendar operational with FFS, FoF 2.0 and RDI-backed funds; quarterly outcome dashboard made public.
12 to 15 months	First annual outcome report published, with survival, jobs and revenue per crore of public support verified against GST and EPFO records and broken out district by district; first ministry scorecard on first-customer targets published; second-chance re-entry operational with published lender weightings; willing state stacks onboarded onto the national spine; outcome-linked budgeting adopted for the next financial year.

The fifteen months cover launch and full national operation. The Mission 10 Lakh targets in Section 4 then accrue over five years of running, that is by 2031.

11. What Success Looks Like in 2031: The Metrics

Strip away the architecture and the acronyms, and the test of this Mission is simple. A young person in a small district decides to build something, says so, and knows exactly where to go, needing no family business, no elite degree, no metro network, and no working knowledge of which ministry runs which scheme. One doorway carries them from opportunity discovery to first customer to growth capital; and if the first venture fails honestly, the system remembers what they learned rather than only what they owed. That scene, repeated at scale, is measurable. The table below states what the Mission should be held to by 2031, with the reasoning behind each figure.

Metric (by 2031)	Target	The logic behind the number
Enterprises taken through the full pathway	10,00,000	About 2 lakh a year against roughly 12 million young Indians reaching working age annually, under 2 per cent of each cohort choosing to build. Ambitious, but not heroic.
Surviving, revenue-earning at year three	6,00,000 (60%)	Three-year survival for new firms in developed economies runs at roughly 55 to 62 per cent with mature advisory and credit infrastructure around them. India’s first-generation, non-metro, largely informal founders start well below that baseline. The Mission’s claim is not to beat the OECD rate but to close the gap to it, and mentorship, professional support and a first customer are precisely the levers that close it.

Metric (by 2031)	Target	The logic behind the number
Direct jobs created	30 to 36 lakh	6 lakh survivors at 5 to 6 people each including the founder. DPIIT-recognised startups currently average around 10 jobs each on self-reported data, so this assumption is deliberately conservative and applies to a very different population.
Enterprises scaling into DPIIT-recognised startups	1,00,000	DPIIT recognised more than 55,200 startups in FY26 alone, so the base case already delivers this without a Mission. The Mission's claim is therefore not volume but composition: that these 1,00,000 come disproportionately from non-metro districts and first-generation founders who would not otherwise have reached recognition.
Annual turnover of Mission enterprises	Rs 3 lakh crore+	6 lakh survivors at a modest average of Rs 50 lakh each. Against nominal GDP projected at Rs 530 to 560 lakh crore in 2031, assuming 9 to 10 per cent nominal growth from the FY26 base, that is of the order of 0.5 to 0.6 per cent of GDP, before second-order activity in supply chains.
Follow-on private capital catalysed	Rs 50,000 crore	A roughly 3x private multiple on public seed capital deployed into the Mission tracks, consistent with the design intent of the FFS, FoF 2.0 and RDI instruments the Mission bridges into.
Share of enterprises from non-metro districts	60%+	Roughly half of new startup activity already comes from tier-2 and tier-3 towns despite metro-centric support. A district-first Mission with a statutory non-metro procurement sub-goal should exceed that share.
Outcome verification	100% of reported outcomes	Survival, revenue and employment cross-checked against GST and EPFO records. No Indian scheme currently does this, which is why no Indian scheme can currently prove its cost per surviving enterprise.

India has built this kind of rail before. Aadhaar gave a billion people an identity, UPI let them transact, Jan Dhan brought them into the financial system. None of these were schemes. They were rails, and everything else was built on top. The lesson India should take from its own success is the one BHASKAR illustrates: an identity that nothing travels on is a directory, and a directory changes nothing. By 2031, the Entrepreneurship Passport, the district Opportunity Maps, the Idea Bank, the co-pilot, the mentor network, the demand-side pathways and the converged capital pools should together form the next layer of India's public infrastructure: the layer on which ordinary Indians build enterprises the way they now make payments, routinely, cheaply, and without asking anyone's permission.

12. Conclusion

India does not lack entrepreneurial energy, schemes or capital. The government has been at this task longer than most governments anywhere, and BHASKAR shows it has already reached the right conclusion about identity. What the effort requires now is a unified system. Support for founders today resembles a relay race in which every runner sprints hard and nobody has agreed how the baton changes hands.

Watching this ecosystem from the inside for over a decade and a half, and watching a few ideas travel the whole distance from a notebook to a billion-dollar company, one thing stands out: the difference between the venture that made it and the thousands that did not was rarely the idea. It was whether, at each fragile stage, somebody or something carried the founder to the next one. The proposal in these pages simply makes that carrying systematic, and available to everyone.

The evidence supports it. The most systematic Indian study of startup failure finds that the two largest causes, capital and go-to-market, together account for more than half of all failures, and India funds them separately. The World Bank's own reviews find that training alone and money alone both underperform, while bundles work. Brazil and the United States have run the district layer for fifty years, Korea has shown how to make mentorship accountable without a compliance apparatus, and Israel has shown how public capital can leave the field once it has done its job. None of this is untested. What is untested is doing it at India's scale, and India has roughly one demographic cycle left in which to try.

This is not another entrepreneurship programme. It is entrepreneurship infrastructure: one doorway, one journey, one lifelong record, with the country's scattered funds converged behind it and its outcomes published for all to see. The state is not being asked to create ten lakh companies. It is being asked to lay the rails on which ten lakh Indians can create them, and in doing so, employ tens of lakhs more.

> India built digital public infrastructure that enabled a billion people to transact. The next challenge is to build entrepreneurial public infrastructure that enables millions to create.

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Annexure: The National Entrepreneurship Stack

The entire blueprint, at a glance.

THE ENTREPRENEUR'S JOURNEY

"I WANT TO DO SOMETHING"

Aspiration

↓

"WHAT CAN I BUILD?"

Opportunity and Idea Discovery • District Opportunity Maps • Idea Bank

↓

"IS THERE A MARKET FOR IT?"

Validation

↓

"TEACH ME HOW"

Learning and Entrepreneurship Skills

↓

"HELP ME BUILD IT"

AI Co-pilot • Mentors • Incubators

↓

"HELP ME START"

Registration • Compliance • Government Schemes

↓

"HELP ME GET CAPITAL"

Grants • Bank Credit • Seed Capital • Equity

↓

"HELP ME FIND CUSTOMERS"

Government • Corporates • GeM • ONDC • Open Market

↓

"HELP ME GROW"

Technology • Talent • Credit • Investment

↓

"HELP ME GO GLOBAL"

Exports • International Markets

↓

"AND IF IT DOES NOT WORK"

Dignified Exit • Honest Record • Accelerated Re-entry

↓

SUSTAINABLE ENTERPRISE

JOBS • INCOMES • INNOVATION • WEALTH CREATION

ONE DIGITAL SPINE CONNECTS THE ENTIRE JOURNEY

ONE ENTREPRENEUR ID

Built on the existing BHASKAR ID. A portable entrepreneurship identity, from first aspiration to growing enterprise.

↓

ONE ENTREPRENEUR DASHBOARD

Learning • Mentorship • Validation • Schemes • Funding • Sales • Growth

↓

ONE INTELLIGENT MATCHING LAYER

The entrepreneur does not need to understand the system. The system understands the entrepreneur, and brings the next opportunity to them.

↓

ONE VERIFIED OUTCOME RECORD

Survival, revenue and jobs cross-checked against GST and EPFO records, not self-declared.

↓

RIGHT LEARNING → RIGHT MENTOR → RIGHT SCHEME → RIGHT CAPITAL → RIGHT MARKET

REGISTRY OR RAIL: THE DISTINCTION THAT DECIDES THIS

A registry (where India is today)	A rail (what the Mission builds)
Issues an identity	Carries a record on that identity
Enables discovery between stakeholders	Carries eligibility between schemes
Runs in parallel with existing forms	Replaces the forms it runs alongside
Users register	Outcomes travel
BHASKAR: 7.4 lakh users, no milestone data	Entrepreneurship Passport: milestones, disbursals, repayment, revenue, jobs, closures

THE STACK CONNECTS WHAT INDIA ALREADY HAS

COLLEGES AND ITIs

↕

INCUBATORS AND MENTORS

↕

CENTRAL AND STATE GOVERNMENT SCHEMES

↕

BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

↕

INVESTORS AND THE STARTUP ECOSYSTEM

↕

GeM • ONDC • CORPORATES • EXPORT MARKETS

Instead of the entrepreneur navigating the ecosystem, the ecosystem is organised around the entrepreneur.

THE OPERATING ARCHITECTURE

ONE ENTREPRENEUR

↓

ONE DIGITAL DOOR

↓

ONE ENTREPRENEUR ID

↓

ONE CONTINUOUS JOURNEY

↓

DISTRICT ENTREPRENEURSHIP NETWORK

↓

STATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP STACK

↓

NATIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP STACK

↓

A LIVE NATIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP MAP

Who wants to start? → Who has started? → Who needs capital? → Who needs customers? → Who is growing? → Who is creating jobs?

THE FUNDAMENTAL SHIFT

TODAY	TOMORROW
Entrepreneur → searches for schemes → searches for training → searches for mentors → approaches banks → finds incubators → searches for customers → searches for investors	Entrepreneur → National Entrepreneurship Stack → Learning + Mentorship + Government + Capital + Markets
The entrepreneur connects the system.	The system connects around the entrepreneur.

THE NORTH STAR

ASPIRATION → ENTERPRISE → INCOME → JOBS → GROWTH

From millions of Indians who say, "I want to do something of my own", to millions who can say, "I built something of my own."